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 SOCIAL MOVEMENT AS COGNITIVE PRAXIS: 
THE CASE OF THE STUDENT AND LABOUR MOVEMENTS 
IN HONG KONG 
 
Benjamin K P Leung 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
The study of social movements has until recently been concerned mainly with their 
causes, their course of development, and their demise. The major theoretical positions in 
this regard have been aptly classified by Doug McAdam (1982) into three models: the 
classical model, the resource mobilization model, and the political process model. The 
theoretical advancement has proceeded from a focus on social structural defects as the 
cause of social movements (classical model), to an emphasis on the resources and 
mobilization potential of challenger groups as the prime determinants of the genesis and 
development of social movements (resource mobilization model), culminating finally in 
an approach which perceives social movements as the end product of the confluence of 
political opportunities, the organizational strength of the challenger groups, and the 
cognitive liberation of the prospective movement participants (the political process 
model). I have made the above cursory reference to the three models as the first step in 
addressing what I conceive to be a hiatus in the study of social movements. Social 
movements have by and large not been theorized as an innovative process, in which the 
movement leaders envisage a new ideal, a new way of life, and pursue that vision through 
collective endeavours. Thus, according to the classical model, social movements are 
triggered by frustrations and discontents with a malfunctioning social-political system; in 
short, social movements rise when the aggrieved population's tempers flare. This 
interpretation of movement participants and movement action as essentially non-rational 
is eclipsed by another theoretical orientation - the resource mobilization model - which 
analyses social movements as rational, planned and calculated attempts to wrestle 
concessions from some established authority. The emphasis in this 'rational' approach is 
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understandably on the challenger group's resources and its capacity to mobilize resources 
in manoevering against an established, often much stronger, opponent. In other words, 
the resource mobilization model sees a social movement as a challenger group's exercise 
of muscles to safeguard or advance its interests. The political process model goes a step 
further. It gives theoretical import to a point implicit, but seldom highlighted in the 
resource mobilization model. Movement leaders give the signals to the prospective 
participants that the time is right for action. Thus, the political process model is 
explicating the point that it takes the 'brain' to interpret the environment and send 
cognitive cues to the 'muscles' for appropriate manoevering. To pursue the metaphor, I 
would say that social movement theories have advanced from an emphasis on 'tempers' to 
one on 'muscles and brain'. What has long been lacking is a focus on 'sentiments' and 
'aspirations'. For this reason, Eyerman and Jamison's recent book Social Movements: A 
Cognitive Approach (1991) can be considered a major contribution in filling the hiatus. 
 
It is tempting to see Eyerman and Jamison's cognitive approach as no more than an 
elaboration of the concept of cognitive cues in McAdam's political process model (1982). 
A careful reading suggests, however, that the cognitive approach opens up a new 
theoretical direction. McAdam's 'cognitive cues' refers to the definition of the political 
environment as favourable or unfavourable for insurgent collective action. Justifying the 
importance of cognitive cues for the study of social movements, McAdam writes: 
  
One of the central problematics of insurgency ... is whether favourable shifts in 
political opportunities will be defined as such by a large enough group of people 
to facilitate collective protest. Challengers experience shifting political conditions 
on a day-to-day basis as a set of 'meaningful' events communicating much about 
their prospects for successful collective action. (1982: 48). 
 
McAdam's cognitive cues are messages to guide the launching and planning of 
prospective collective political action. They are part and parcel of the political strategies 
(the 'brain') which are the defining feature of the political process model. Eyerman and 
Jamison's cognitive approach goes further, as their following statements indicate: 
 
Social movements are ... best conceived ... as movements of collective creation 
that provide societies with ideas, identities, and even ideals. ... Our approach thus 
focuses upon the process of articulating a movement identity (cognitive praxis), 
on the actors taking part in this process (movement intellectuals), and on the 
contexts of articulation (political cultures and institutions). (1991: 4). 
 
In perceiving social movements as collective creations of social identities and ideals in 
the contexts of political cultures and institutions, Eyerman and Jamison reconceptualize 
social movements as innovative or revitalizing visionary processes. In this process, the 
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movement participants, especially the movement intellectuals, often draw on national or 
cultural traditions to articulate new identities and ideals. This means that social 
movements are more than, and hence cannot be understood solely as, planned collective 
actions to confront an established authority to wrestle concessions and bring about 
changes. What inspires and motivates a social movement is not necessarily a favourable 
political opportunity. It can be a commitment to an idea or ideal, or a sentimental 
attachment to a cherished national or cultural value. In Weberian language, we can say 
that a social movement is not only rational goal-oriented action; it is often also rational 
value-oriented or even affectually-oriented action. This is what I meant by 'sentiments' 
and 'aspirations' in my earlier arguments. 
  
In my view, one main contribution of the cognitive approach is the thesis that our 
knowledge of what a social movement is about can be advanced by examining the 
movement within its historical and cultural contexts. While acknowledging that 
movement organizations and political opportunities are crucial in determining the genesis 
and development of social movements, we have to bear in mind that social movements 
are after all collective endeavours to realize certain aspirations or to uphold some 
cherished values and sentiments, which are rooted in specific historical and cultural 
contexts. On the international level, these contexts constitute the basis for a comparative 
study of social movements in diverse societies. In this respect, Eyerman and Jamison 
observe for instance that 'social movements in the U.S. have been colored by a kind of 
religious and moral fervor that is largely absent in Europe, where the historical struggle 
between the "main class antagonists" has been central for the past as well as the 
contemporary movements' (1991: 37). But the cognitive approach also yields a valuable 
theoretical orientation in the study of social movements within one social-cultural 
context. It suggests the need and importance of theorizing social movements as the 
product of deep-rooted national traditions and prevailing social sentiments. It highlights 
the fact that it is often such cultural values and social sentiments which give a social 
movement its character and contents. They are the 'script' of a collective drama; 
organizational resources and political opportunities are the stage props and facilities. 
 
The present paper is based theoretically on the insights I have derived above from 
Eyerman and Jamison's cognitive approach. I shall conceptualize social movements as 
cognitive praxis - a term central to the cognitive approach - which refers to the process of 
articulating and putting into practice a collective vision or ideal. I shall dwell particularly 
on the inputs from the historical and cultural contexts into the articulation as well as the 
truncation and demise of this ideal. My objective is not to dislodge the political process 
model from its rightful theoretical position, but to show that much understanding about 
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social movements can be gained by viewing them as value-rational rather than 
instrumental-rational action. 
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THE STUDY 
 
I choose the student movement and the labour movement for the present study mainly for 
the reason that students and labour are two very different social categories who can be 
expected to have divergent concerns and perspectives. On the whole, students are not 
burdened with the down-to-earth problems of making a living or of negotiating with 
management for higher wages and better working conditions. Free from mundane daily 
concerns, they are more inclined to the pursuit of higher values and ideals. They are, as a 
cliche puts it, 'the conscience of society'. In contrast, workers can be expected to have 
relatively more pragmatic and parochial interests and perspectives focusing on work-
related matters. My argument for the relevance of inputs from the historical and cultural 
contexts into social movements would therefore be very much strengthened if I could 
identify common denominators of historical-cultural significance in the social 
movements of these two different social categories.  
 
Such common denominators would also give us valuable insights into the collective 
consciousness; they are an important reflection of the ethos of the community. In other 
words, this study of the student movement and labour movement as cognitive praxis has 
two objectives: the primary objective of investigating how the historical and cultural 
contexts impact on social movements; and the secondary objective of using the 
movements' ideas and ideals as a reflection of the major concerns and cherished values of 
society. 
 
My study will cover the post Second World War period of 1946 to the late 1980s. The 
end of the War was immediately followed by the Civil War in China between the 
Guomindang (the Nationalist Party) and the Communist Party. The eventual victory of 
the Communists and the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 led to a large 
influx of refugees from the Mainland to Hong Kong. The attitude of these refugees as 
well as of the original inhabitants towards Hong Kong was ambivalent. They cherished it 
as a safe haven. Yet it was also a legacy, a monument of the transgression of Chinese 
territories by the western imperialist powers. Hence if the 'don't rock the boat' refugee 
mentality was the main factor contributing to Hong Kong's stability, that mentality was 
also tinged with undercurrents of nationalism and anti-colonialism. For the Hong Kong 
Chinese, China under communism thus evoked ambivalent, contradictory feelings and 
sentiments. Most of them regarded communism with apprehension and even aversion, yet 
many also took pride in the New China with its bold stand against western capitalist 
imperialism. It is my contention in this paper that the ambivalence of the Hong Kong 
Chinese towards the Colony, and their ambivalence towards Communist China, have 
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been a major underlying feature of the ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese. For most of 
Hong Kong's post Second World War history, and for most of the Hong Kong Chinese, 
that ambivalence has tilted in favour of the refugee, anti-communist mentality. Yet the 
other side of the ambivalence, sentiments of nationalism and anti-colonialism that so 
often have been eclipsed by Hong Kong's economic prosperity, retained its mobilizing 
potential for collective action. For reasons stated above, China has remained the main 
factor for fueling or dampening nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments and the 
contingent collective actions. In other words, major events and developments in China, 
and its relation with the west and in particular with Britain, constituted important 
cognitive cues for collective opposition actions in Hong Kong. The main thrust of my 
arguments in this paper is that such cognitive cues, which have to be understood in the 
peculiar political and cultural contexts of Hong Kong, provide us with fresh insights into 
the genesis, development and nature of the student movement and the labour movement 
in Hong Kong. To understand these movements as cognitive praxis is to comprehend 
how the movement participants articulated these cognitive cues and put them into 
practice. 
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THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AS COGNITIVE PRAXIS 
 
The Awakening 
 
The student movement in Hong Kong, which involved mainly university students, did not 
take off until the late 1960s. Commenting on the long period of student non-involvement 
in social and political activities since the founding of the first university in Hong Kong in 
1912, a student leader wrote: 
 
(The students) had no sense of belonging to Hong Kong, and only adopted the 
attitude of an indifferent observer on events in China. ... A stagnant, totally 
uncritical and despondent atmosphere pervaded the whole university campus. 
Material satisfaction and degenerate personal honour and status were what the 
students looked for .... (Cheuk 1978: 144). 
 
The impetus of change came, not from within the student body, but from an incident that 
forced the Hong Kong people, colonizers and colonized alike, to rethink seriously the 
political status and political future of Hong Kong. This was the 1967 riots1, which lasted 
from May till the end of the year and were undoubtedly the most traumatic social-
political disruptions in Hong Kong's post-war history. These riots were inspired by the 
Cultural Revolution in China, which was gathering momentum in early 1967. They began 
as two minor industrial disputes in April. The left-wing trade unions and communist 
sympathizers were quick to seize the opportunity to escalate the disputes into a territory-
wide confrontation against the colonial government and capitalist enterprises in Hong 
Kong. The 1967 disturbances with their strong nationalist flavour thus poignantly 
reminded the Hong Kong people of the uncertainty of Hong Kong's political future. They 
also awakened the university students from their habitual indifference and silence. At the 
height of the riots, for instance, the student publication of the University of Hong Kong, 
the Undergrad (13 July issue), published an article with the title 'Has Hong Kong a 
Future?'. This article, which was just one of many others of a similar nature appearing in 
student publications and public magazines, exemplified the first change of mood and 
concern among university students. 'If we accept that it is we who have to decide our 
future', this article stated, '... we will have to strive to achieve more active participation in 
politics, we will have to campaign for the allegiance of our youth, ... we need to reform 
our educational system ...'. At the end of the year, both as a retrospect to the causes of the 
riots and a prospect for what to do in the future, the Undergrad (1 December issue) 
published an article entitled 'The Riots, Public Opinions, and the Adoption of Chinese as 
an Official Language'. The article represented one of the first attempts among university 
students to analyze the 1967 riots in terms of the national and cultural identity of the 
Hong Kong Chinese, and of the glaring inequality in the community and lack of 
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communication between the colonial government and the Chinese community. The seeds 
of student involvement in social-political issues were sown in the political overtones and 
nationalist sentiments of the 1967 riots. 
 
The seeds came to their first fruition in February 1969, when the students of the 
University of Hong Kong started the University Reform Movement. Student participation 
in university administration was the theme of the Reform Movement, and though the 
students' gains were modest - the most important of which being student representation in 
the University's Senate Board - the Movement had far-reaching effects. Several months 
later, around 50 students, mostly from Hong Kong's two universities, staged a two-day 
sit-in outside a post-secondary college, the Chu Hai College, in protest against the 
college authorities' dismissal of 12 students who had allegedly attacked the college 
authorities in student publications. While hardly a significant issue in terms of the 
number of participants and the duration of the protest, this was the first time university 
students took to the streets to protest about an issue not directly related to their own 
university; it was also the first time students of different academic institutions cooperated 
in protest action. A student movement was in the making.  
 
 
The High Tide 
 
Issues on campus and in the larger society continued to occupy the students, but the one 
issue which spurred the burgeoning student movement to its zenith and contoured its 
development up to the mid-1970s had no direct bearing on the welfare of the indigenous 
community. This was the claims from both the Chinese Government and the Japanese 
Government in 1970 to territorial rights over the Tiao Yu Tai Islands.2 Students in Hong 
Kong viewed the Japanese claim as a revival of Japanese militarism and this brought 
back memories of Japan's invasion of China during the Second World War. Nationalist 
sentiments soared among the Hong Kong students as they marched in protest against 
Japanese imperialism and in defence of the integrity of Chinese territory. In some of 
these protest demonstrations, there were clashes between the students and the police in 
which the police resorted to brutal force against the student protesters. Scenes of students 
with blood running down their faces and of the police, often headed by British officers, 
raising their truncheons against the students, side-tracked the protesters' attention to what 
they now experienced and felt as repression in a colony. Nationalist feelings were already 
rampant in the Tiao Yu Tai Protest, and these now quickly encompassed anti-
colonialism. The Tiao Yu Tai issue faded by May 1972, but nationalist sentiments and 
their off-shoot anti-colonialism continued to fuel the student movement in the next few 
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years. 
 
The growth of these sentiments, and hence the development of the student movement, 
was contingent both on the march of events relating to China and on the students' 
ambivalence towards the existing regime in China. Events occurring on the international 
scene helped to foster the students' nationalist dispositions: China's readmission into the 
United Nations in 1971, President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972, and China's 
table-tennis diplomacy in the early 1970s boosted its international status. These 
developments, in addition to the students' recent experience with colonial repression, 
contributed at least temporarily to an 'ambivalence bias' in favour of pro-China 
sentiments. To many of the most committed student activists of the time, Hong Kong's 
future lay in its reunion with China, and their job was to prepare the Chinese people of 
Hong Kong for this reunion through educating them about contemporary China. To equip 
themselves for this mission, university students organized and undertook 'China Tours', 
and set up China Study Groups for university and post-secondary college students. For 
the first half of the 1970s, the student movement in Hong Kong had a strong nationalist 
pro-China flavour. Almost every issue of university student publications during that time 
contained some introduction to the socialist development in China or reports about 
happenings in China. 
 
But there was also a group of university student activists who did not identify themselves 
with the communist regime in China. This other side of the ambivalence had some 
reservations, and were critical, about China's policies. These students attacked the pro-
China students as blindly accepting and following China's directions. The student 
movement in its heyday was thus ironically split between a pro-China faction and another 
faction labelled the Social Action Faction.3 Following China's policy of peaceful co-
existence with the western capitalist regimes, the pro-China faction by and large 
refrained from direct confrontation against the indigenous colonial authorities. They 
considered their main mission to be socialist education in preparation for reunion with 
the motherland. The Social Action Faction, on the other hand, took a broad view of 
nationalism which they did not consider to be necessarily coterminous with following the 
current regime in China. They expressed their nationalist sentiments in protest actions 
against the indigenous colonial order. While the two factions pursued their respective 
missions in the larger society, they also battled with each other on campus to gain control 
of the student union and student publications. The pro-China faction, however, remained 
the dominant force within the student movement in the first half of the 1970s. With the 
pro-socialist China students attempting to purge the allegedly renegade elements within 
the student body, the student movement was to some extent a miniature copy of the 
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concurrent Cultural Revolution in mainland China. 
 
It was thus natural that the demise of the Cultural Revolution brought a drastic turn in the 
development of the student movement in Hong Kong. The death of Chairman Mao and 
the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976 dealt a fatal blow to the pro-China faction. In 
identifying with China's policies in the past few years, the pro-China faction had quite 
naturally associated themselves with the policies of the then dominant political figures, 
and now the pro-China faction found to their surprise and embarrassment that they had 
been betting on the wrong horse. They had, so it seemed to most students at the time, 
unwittingly misled and misguided the student movement in the past. Disgraced and 
disoriented, and no longer able to justify themselves as leaders of the student movement, 
they receded from the scene. So from 1976, if there was still a pro-China faction in the 
universities and post-secondary colleges, they kept a low profile in the political life of the 
students. But as they had been one of the main carriers of the student movement, with 
their retreat, the student movement lost much of its drive and momentum. Lacking a well 
defined long-term objective like that of the pro-China faction, the student movement now 
became issue-oriented. At the same time, the Social Action Faction gradually 
disintegrated. It had been, after all, a loosely organized group of students held together 
through their opposition to a rival faction. A number of social issues, the most important 
of which was the Golden Jubilee Secondary School Protest Issue of 1978, sustained the 
momentum of the student movement for a few more years.4 But since the beginning of 
the 1980s, the student movement has remained low-key and inconspicuous. Its glorious 
days were over. 
 
 
The Eclipse 
 
The 1980s were a time of important changes in Hong Kong. Margaret Thatcher's visit to 
Beijing in September 1982 and the ensuing Sino-British negotiations turned the attention 
of the Hong Kong people to the issue of Hong Kong's future. The signing of the Sino-
British Joint Declaration in 1984, which confirmed the sovereignty of China over Hong 
Kong after 1997, ushered in a number of major developments bearing on Hong Kong's 
future. The preparation for self-government by the Hong Kong people became the 
predominant concern of the local community. Various social groups in Hong Kong 
actively expressed their different, often conflicting views about what sort of government 
would be most appropriate for the post-1997 Hong Kong. The drafting of the Basic Law 
(which began in 1985 and took almost five years to complete) for the future Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region similarly provoked controversies and heated arguments 
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both within the indigenous community, and between segments of the local population and 
the Chinese government. Then there came the historic 1989 student protests and pro-
democracy movement in China. An estimated two million Hong Kong people took part in 
march demonstrations in support of the ongoing protest movements on the Mainland. In 
the aftermath, a pro-democracy movement emerged in Hong Kong with the objectives of 
providing continuing support to the pro-democracy activists in China and furthering 
democracy in Hong Kong. Indeed the momentous events of the 1980s would lead one to 
expect a resurgence of the student movement in Hong Kong. 
 
In fact student activists continued to play an active role in social and political issues 
throughout the 1980s. In my view, the insignificance of the student movement in the 
1980s has to be understood not so much in terms of the organizational strength or the 
ideological commitment of students as in the socio-political context of Hong Kong at the 
time. The aforementioned developments in the 1980s had politicized the society. 
Commenting on this phenomenon, Louie writes: 
 
The traditionally apathetic Hong Kong people suddenly became very sensitive 
and alert to politics. A wide spectrum of views and opinions surged. ...  New 
organizations were formed with the clear objective of contributing to the 
preparation of the territory's future. ... These organizations were collectively 
called, by the media as well as by themselves, 'groups of political commentary'. ... 
The 'groups of political commentary' soon gave way to 'groups of political 
participation'. (1991: 58-59). 
 
Concurrent with this politicization was an upsurge of interest among the Hong Kong 
Chinese in nascent developments in China - an interest generated by China's economic 
reforms and open-door policy since 1976. The Hong Kong Chinese acquired substantial 
knowledge of their motherland as many of them went to the Mainland on sightseeing 
tours and as the mass media in Hong Kong increased their coverage of events in China. 
This and the rapidly expanding role of newly formed political groups in indigenous 
social-political matters meant that the students had lost their pioneering and leading role 
of the 1970s. On the one hand, their function as the educator on socialist development in 
China had now become obsolete and superfluous. On the other, their role in local issues 
had been gradually eclipsed and superceded by the mushrooming political organizations. 
To the extent that a social movement is identified by its distinctive ideal and the attendant 
collective action, the student movement's identity was submerged in the sea-change that 
was sweeping the community in the 1980s. In this respect, a former student leader 
comments with insight on the eclipse of the student movement: 
 
The large-scale exhibitions, talks and other activities organized by the students in 
the 1970s to introduce happenings in China have now lost much of their 
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significance and value. ....  In the major social actions of recent years, the student 
body has played only a subordinate role in the joint efforts of various pressure 
groups. The hard truth is: the student body is now no more than just a target for 
mobilization by other activist groups. (Chan 1987). 
 
In the language of Eyerman and Jamison's cognitive approach, a social movement is a 
'cognitive territory'. In the 1980s, the student movement had lost its 'cognitive territory' to 
larger, stronger forces. 
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THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AS COGNITIVE PRAXIS 
 
A Historical Profile 
 
I shall use trade union membership and the level of industrial strikes in constructing a 
historical profile of the labour movement. Union membership is an indicator of the 
numerical strength of the labour movement. The level of strikes is a reflection of the 
willingness and capacity of workers to act collectively to confront and wrestle 
concessions from management. Strikes are therefore an expression of the unity and 
political strength of working people, and of their determination to defend and advance 
their interests and rights. For this reason, strikes are the single most important indication 
of the strength and nature of the labour movement. 
 
In the following table, I provide the available data on trade union density (i.e. union 
membership as a percentage of total employees) rather than the absolute number of union 
members. The number of union members may rise and fall with the expansion and 
contraction of the labour force. Union density, in taking into account the changing size of 
the workforce, is hence a more reliable indicator of the strength of the labour movement 
relative to an existing workforce. The level of strikes, however, is more difficult to 
measure. It can be gauged by the number of strikes, the duration of strikes (in number of 
days), or the number of participants in strikes. A composite index, which takes into 
account all these measures, is the number of working days lost, calculated as follows: 
 
No. of working days lost = No. of strikes x Duration of strikes x No. of strikers 
(in a particular period)  (in a particular period) 
 
As in the case of union density, the level of strikes will be expressed as number of 
working days lost per 1,000 workers in the following table. 
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Trade Union Density and Level of Industrial Strikes in Hong Kong  
1946 - 1989 
 
 
 Year Union Density  Number of working days 
   lost per 1,000 workers 
 
 1946 - 47  2,385 
 1947 - 48  5,429 
 1948 - 49  433 
 1949 - 50  2,814 
 1950 - 51  48 
 1951 - 52  566 
 1952 - 53   2 
 1953 - 54  1,470 
 1954 - 55  30 
 1955 - 56  335 
 1956 - 57  69 
 1957 - 58  90 
 1958 - 59  13 
 1959 - 60  159 
 1960 - 61  127 
 1961 - 62  77 
 1962 - 63  98 
 1963 - 64  243 
 1964 - 65  123 
 1965 - 66  183 
 1966 - 67  99 
 1967 - 68 13.8 - 
 1968 - 69 13.5 33 
 1969 - 70 17.4 40 
 1972 - 73 18.6 77 
 1973 - 74 21.2 82 
 1974 - 75 22.0 18 
 1975 23.9 23 
 1976 25.2 6 
 1977 23.8 14 
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  Year Union Density  Number of working days 
   lost per 1,000 workers 
 
 1978 22.6 37 
 1979 20.7 45 
 1980 18.5 22 
 1981 16.1 17 
 1982  16.4 21 
 1983 16.1 3 
 1984 16.1 3 
 1985  16.1 1 
 1986  15.7 6 
 1987 15.7  3 
 1988 15.7 3 
 1989 16.6 0.04 
 
 
 
Notes
 
1.  This table has been constructed on the basis on data provided in the Annual Reports of the Labour 
Department. The Department did not provide information on the 'political' strikes of 1967 - 68, 
though industrial conflict in that year was at its highest level in post-war Hong Kong. 
 
2.  Data before 1975 cover financial years (1 April - 31 March). Data from 1975 cover calender 
years. 
 
3.  Data on union density before 1967-68 not available.  But according to Joe England's estimate 
(1979), 1946-50 was a period of union growth, and 1951-69 was a period of union stagnation.  
 
4.  'Workers' refers to employees in registered establishments.  
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On the basis of the above table and the accompanying footnotes, we can construct the 
following periodization of the labour movement in Hong Kong:5 
 
 Periods of union growth Periods of union stagnation 
 
  1946 - 50  1951 - 69   
 1970 - 76  1977 - 89 
  
 
 Periods of high  Periods of low  
 industrial conflict industrial conflict 
 
 1946 - 50 1951 - 66   
 1967 1968 - 89 
 
 
Several features emerge from the analysis so far. First, it is only in the period 1946-50 
that union growth coincided with high industrial conflict. The second period of union 
growth, 1970-76, was a period of low industrial conflict. This suggests that in the Hong 
Kong case, union growth is not necessarily conducive to the workers' propensity to strike. 
This also suggests that we need to look for different explanations for the two aspects - 
trade unionism and industrial strikes - of the labour movement in Hong Kong. This 
observation is buttressed by the anomaly of 1967, the year of the highest industrial 
conflict in Hong Kong's post-war history, and yet also a year falling in a period of union 
stagnation. Then there are the periods of 'coincidence or consistency' between union 
stagnation and low industrial conflict: 1951-66 and 1978-89.  
 
In the following sections, I shall attempt an explanation of these features and the trend of 
the labour movement from the perspective of the cognitive approach. I make no claim 
that this is a comprehensive explanation. My intention is rather to highlight the 
contributions which the cognitive approach can make to our understanding of this 
particular Hong Kong case. 
 
 
1946-50: Union Growth and High Industrial Conflict 
 
The background of the labour movement in the immediate post-war years and indeed in 
subsequent years was described by Joe England in his seminal work (1989) on industrial 
relations in Hong Kong: 
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... a by-product of the Japanese occupation (of Hong Kong) was the emergence of 
a strong Communist influence in immediate post-war Hong Kong .... The chief 
anti-Japanese guerilla force in Guangdong province during the occupation was a 
Communist-dominated band .... Many people from Hong Kong slipped out of the 
colony to join these guerillas and a number in time became convinced 
Communists. ... (By the end of the war), many returned to Hong Kong and it was 
these men, dedicated and battle-hardened, who formed the solid core of Hong 
Kong's Communists in the post-war years. They began to organize the workers ... 
(England 1989: 109-110) 
 
There were other factors contributing to union growth, but the above is undoubtedly of 
the most long-lasting significance in Hong Kong's post-war trade union movement. The 
civil war in China and the advancing success of the Communists consolidated and 
expanded the group of Communist sympathizers in Hong Kong, culminating in the 
founding of the pro-Communist Federation of Trade Unions in 1947. At the same time, 
the anti-Communist, pro-Guomindang forces were mobilizing support in the Colony for 
their cause. They founded in 1948 the pro-Guomindang Trade Union Council. The 
competition of these two rival factions for support and membership led to an upsurge of 
trade unionism. But in respect of strikes, a substantial number was instigated and 
organized by the left-wing unions, who apparently intended to match the success of the 
Communists on the Mainland with a similar success in the Colony. The Commissioner of 
Labour at the time described these strikes as 'labour disputes where politics dominates 
economics' (Annual Report ending 31 March 1950: 50) and stated that many of the 
behind-the-scenes advisers in these strikes 'were suspected to have been in close touch as 
to policy with labour bodies in Canton and on the Chinese mainland generally' (Annual 
Report 1950: 49). Thus right from the beginning of the post-war period, the labour 
movement was a cognitive praxis of political orientations which to a large extent were 
shaped by developments in China and union rivalries in Hong Kong. It was thus natural 
that the tide of union activism in Hong Kong subsided when China entered into a new 
phase of development after the turmoil of civil war and revolution.  
 
 
1951-1966: Union Stagnation and Industrial Peace 
 
This period began in the aftermath of Britain's recognition of the People's Republic of 
China in 1950 and in the context of a tacit understanding between Britain and China over 
the status of Hong Kong. It ended at the dawn of the Cultural Revolution. In this decade 
and a half, the left-wing unions by and large refrained from direct involvement in 
industrial disputes. Joe England, I think, rightly attributed this to the left-wing unions' 
'desire to maintain the economic stability of Hong Kong from which China derived a 
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substantial proportion of her foreign exchange' (1979: 30). In addition, it was also a time 
when refugees continued to flood into Hong Kong from across the border. The 'don't rock 
the boat' refugee mentality was the prevailing climate. The larger objectives of the two 
rival union factions - the objectives of building a favourable image and consolidating 
their influence in the community - disposed them to act in consonance with the prevailing 
mood of the populace. Thus both sides concentrated on providing welfare benefits for 
union members and, when the opportunity arose, attacked the industrial action of the 
rival faction as irresponsible and detrimental to the interests of the community. As an 
illustration, the rhetoric of the two factions in the 1954 strike of left-wing tramway 
workers is illuminating. The right-wing unions launched their attack: 
 
We know well that in calling a strike, these people are trying to safeguard the 
position of a few so-called union leaders and not serving the interests of workers. 
... We are determined to stand firm in our dedication to lead the just and free 
Tramway workers to perform their duties responsibly. We will not take part in 
any action that for selfish motives would jeopardize the workers' employment. 
(Wah Kiu Yat Po, 10 October 1954 issue). 
 
The left-wing unions responded in a press report:  
 
In the interests of the public, tramway workers have decided to resume work from 
today. (Man Wui Po, 11 October 1954 issue). 
 
In a situation where the two factions which dominated and controlled the labour 
movement were pre-occupied with mutual denigration and were apparently guided more 
by partisan political orientations than by a commitment to safeguard the workers' 
interests against management, the workers understandably became cynical of trade 
unionism and recoiled from union activities. But the Cultural Revolution was soon to 
provoke many of them into an outburst of nationalist sentiments in the many industrial 
strikes and terrorist acts that made 1967 the most traumatic year in Hong Kong's post-war 
history. 
 
 
1967: The Colony in Conflict 
 
In terms of its impact on industrial relations in Hong Kong, the Cultural Revolution is 
reminiscent of the Communist Revolution of the late 1940s. They both infused labour 
disputes with a nationalist anti-colonial orientation. It seems that revolutionary fervour 
on the Mainland inevitably had its repercussions on the colonial capitalist enclave just 
across the border. The initial episodes - two minor labour disputes in April - of the 1967 
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disturbances already bore the imprint of that fervour. John Cooper's description of the 
reaction of the strikers on their arrest by the police provides some evidence: 
 
As they were led away to police vehicles the arrested men hurled abuse, shouted 
communist slogans, and a few of their number brandished aloft copies of Mao 
Tse-tung's quotations ...  (1970: 6). 
 
The intervention of the police readily transformed the industrial disputes into a political 
confrontation against the colonial government and its alleged ally, capitalist management. 
Originating as a dispute between labour and management, the conflict now rapidly 
escalated into a territory-wide nationalist anti-colonial struggle. In May, the Federation of 
Trade Unions and several other left-wing organizations established two struggle 
committees (the All Trades Struggle Committee and the All Circles Struggle Committee) 
to 'struggle against Hong Kong British persecution, to strengthen unity, ... to denounce 
Hong Kong British bloody atrocity ... ' (Ta Kung Po, 13 May 1967 issue). The formation 
of struggle committees was soon followed by a wave of some 18 short strikes in the last 
week of May. By the beginning of June, a left-wing press in Hong Kong was proclaiming 
'a widespread mass movement to oppose national oppression and defend national honour' 
(Man Wui Po, 6 June 1967 issue). Meanwhile, encouragement came from China in the 
form of an important editorial in the People's Daily (3 June 1967 issue) which called 
upon the Hong Kong compatriots to form a broad revolutionary front and be 'ready at any 
time to respond to the call of the motherland and smash the reactionary rule of British 
imperialism'.6 
 
The struggle continued with three territory-wide co-ordinated strike actions launched by 
left-wing trade unions in June. At the height of the struggle, the New China News 
Agency in Hong Kong proclaimed a total of 500,000 industrial workers on strike, and 
asserted that 'politically, the arrogance of British colonial rulers in Hong Kong has been 
deflated and their real nature, that of a paper tiger, has been completely exposed'.7 These 
large-scale strike efforts were followed by a number of sporadic strikes in July. By late 
July, the period of unrest in which industrial action played a prominent role came to a 
close. Thereafter, the leftists resorted to terrorism and bomb attacks, which increasingly 
alienated the local community from the pro-Communist groups. The turmoil finally faded 
by the end of the year amidst signs of improvement in Sino-British relations.8 
 
 
1968-90: Industrial Peace 
 
The level of strikes dropped drastically in the aftermath of the 1967 disturbances. The 
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declining trend continued with minor fluctuations through the rest of the period. Union 
membership as reflected in union density, however, exhibited a less consistent trend. It 
started an upward climb in 1970, but after reaching a zenith in 1976, reversed in a 
downhill direction. Once again these ups and downs of the labour movement bore a close 
relationship to major developments in China. China's advancement in international 
respectability and status, as evidenced by the United States' relaxation of travel and 
trading restrictions with China in 1969, the resumption of full ambassadorial meetings 
between the United States and China in 1970, China's entry into the United Nations in 
1971, and President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972, boosted the image and 
standing of the left-wing trade unions in Hong Kong. Union growth in these few years 
owed much to the increase in left-wing union membership. As an illuminating aside, it is 
worth mentioning that this union growth coincided with the economic recession of 1974 
and 19759, which was one of the worst recessions in Hong Kong's post-war economy. 
That the level of industrial conflict remained low in these years is a testimony to the fact 
that in Hong Kong, factors other than union strength and economic hardship are more 
significant in shaping industrial relations and the direction of the labour movement. 
Explaining industrial peace in these two years, Joe England observed: 
 
The left-wing unions as 'transmission belts between the party and the masses' 
were under instruction from the mainland to maintain a stabilizing influence 
rather than to protest at workers being made the victims of a capitalist crisis. 
(1979: 95).  
 
The death of Mao Zedong and the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976, however, had a 
disruptive impact on left-wing union growth as they had on the pro-China faction of the 
student movement. Membership in left-wing unions, for instance, dropped from 228,313 
in 1979 to 169,647 in 1981, and 168,550 in 1987. This contributed to the fall in union 
density in the overall industrial workforce. At the same time, China's economic reforms 
and open-door policy since the late 1970s, and the concomitant expanding capital 
investments from Hong Kong in China, increased Hong Kong's economic value to China. 
Indigenous developments in the 1980s in light of Hong Kong's post-1997 status also 
brought about a profound change in the orientations and policies of the trade unions in 
Hong Kong. The pro-Taiwan Trade Union Council and its affiliates now realized that to 
continue in their antagonism against the pro-China Federation of Trade Union would be 
fighting a lost battle. Union rivalry, in any case, was not congenial to the prevailing 
concern of the labour community, which was co-operative preparation for the historic 
transition. The emerging stance of the labour movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
is well represented in a statement from the chairman of the FTU at its 1988 General 
Meeting: 
24 THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AS COGNITIVE PRAXIS 
 
We are willing to foster closer unity and co-operation with all workers, trade 
unions, labour organizations and people from other strata of the society and make 
common contributions to the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.10 
 
It is evident that with the politicization of the society in the 1980s, the working class 
were becoming increasingly concerned with defending and advancing its interests in 
juxtaposition to the claims of other social groups. Trade unionists of different political 
persuasions were aware of the importance for labour to establish a political niche for 
themselves in the future Special Administration Region. It seems that the labour 
movement will be facing a new challenge in the 1990s, as its factions attempt to resolve 
their differences in order to strengthen the position of the working class, and as its leaders 
try to maintain the balance between China's interests and the interests of labour in Hong 
Kong. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
My theoretical focus in this paper has been on the cognitive dimension of social 
movements. I have opted for this cognitive approach because most previous theories of 
social movements, including the influential resource mobilization theory and political 
process model, were by and large explanations of 'how social movements come about', 
and not so much explanations of 'what social movements are about'. The theoretical 
interest, in short, has been on the 'mechanics' rather than the 'meaning' of social 
movements. Such a theoretical orientation assumes either that people will rebel when 
they are dissatisfied with an existing social-political order (the classical model), or that 
they will strike when they think their chances of winning are high (the resource 
mobilization model and the political process model). What these theories tend to 
overlook is the possibility that social movements could be sparked off and sustained by 
sentiments not akin to the rebel's anger or the strategist's rational calculation. These 
sentiments may be rooted in the larger contexts - in a people's collective history, and in 
events and developments that evoke memories of that history or that impact on the 
collective consciousness. To understand social movements, one therefore has to take into 
account the larger contexts of culture, history, and major ongoing developments. In my 
above descriptive accounts of the student movement and the labour movement, I have 
tried to show that these movements to a large extent derived their ideas, values and 
identities from these larger contexts. I have also tried to demonstrate how these 
movements changed in nature and significance upon changes in the larger contexts. In 
both movements, the participants articulated from major ongoing events a meaning which 
then became the orientation or the ideal of the movement for a period of time. The two 
movements developed and changed as new meanings were articulated from current 
events. It is my contention that such changes in the cognitive praxis of the two 
movements provide the key to understanding their development. For, as Eyerman and 
Jamison write: 
 
Social movements express shifts in the consciousness of actors as they are 
articulated ... in historically situated political and cultural contexts. (1991: 4). 
My study also shows that China has been the main source of meanings or cognitive cues 
for the two social movements in question. This substantiates a point I made in the 
introductory section about the ambivalence of the Hong Kong Chinese towards the 
Colony and towards the People's Republic of China. Thus when revolutionary, anti-
imperialist and nationalist sentiments soared in China, Hong Kong's colonial status came 
to the fore in the collective consciousness of the Hong Kong Chinese and triggered off 
collective actions with a strong nationalist anti-colonial favour. In this sense, the student 
movement of the early 1970s and the labour movement of the late 1940s and in 1967 
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were miniature cognitive praxis of the revolution in the motherland. But the other side of 
the ambivalence also gave rise to a faction within both movements which was opposed to 
the pro-China faction. If the rivalry between the two factions characterized the student 
movement in its heyday, it remained the dominant feature of the labour movement until 
the late 1980s. In both movements, the pro-China faction suffered a major set-back when 
the Cultural Revolution came to its ignominious end in 1976. When China embarked on a 
new path of development in 1977, so did the student movement and the labour movement 
in Hong Kong. When the rhetoric of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism faded in China, 
it also subsided in the two movements in Hong Kong. These are the common 
denominators between the student movement and the labour movements. They reflect, I 
think, an important aspect of the collective consciousness of the Hong Kong Chinese.  
 
In the 1980s, that collective consciousness was pre-occupied with the issue of 1997. As 
the Hong Kong Chinese prepared themselves for self-government, the labour movement 
was carving out for itself a new cognitive territory - the ideal of uniting labour into a 
solidary political force. The student movement, however, was unable to find its identity 
when its cognitive territory was taken over by more powerful forces and movements. The 
student leaders were there; the student organizations were there; and student activism 
continued. But lacking a unique cognitive territory, the student movement was hardly at 
all recognizable. This last testimony to the importance of conceptualizing social 
movement as cognitive praxis also brings my discussion to its conclusion. 




